To my knowledge:
B2 is data storage, Backblaze Personal is a service. 2 Completely different things.
You can share albums with other users, or even with a public link.
That is not what i have asked.
I doubt that this applies to files smaller than the pack size or a for example bitwise unique 17MB file would result in a (overly simplified) 16 MB and a 1 MB chunk or am i wrong here?
I use B2 for my restic Backup. Currently i have about 100GB stored there and it says i have about 100,000 files stored.
With the adjusted calculation of the blog you posted for 10TB of 50KB files, adjusted to the mean file size of my restic repository 10 TB of 1MB files:
Transaction fees: 10,000,000 / 10,000 x $0.004 = $4
My Laptop has a mean file size of about 16 MB per file on the local restic repository.
EDIT: Forgot a resume, i do not think you need to worry about it too much. But maybe verify the amount and type of data you want to backup and use calculators to calculate the real cost, also you can always test it by creating a test dataset and then do a backup and recovery scenario and then use this to derive an estimate.
As I said, when you know the exact path of a media item on the server then you can check if the item exists.
If you choose a none standard filepath its not an issue.
Should that be fixed yes.
Whats the scenario? A law firm could brute force check all media items on open jellyfin servers? Highly illegal to exploit something like this in a lot of jurisdiction. And would also not proof the existence of the media on the server, just a file named like it.
Mitigation? Just add another random letter in the docker-compose mount path.
Have you even read the issues and understood them?
Yes, those should be fixed, but unless you are worried about someone hijacking a video stream when you use a generic media path, there is not that much to worry about.
deleted by creator
7.0-rc7 is probably due to the 7.0 release early mid april. So the fix was in the mainline on 1st of April. The commit on 11th from GKH was probably due to the release.
I am not that familiar with the commit and release structure to get more into detail. But to me it clearly looks like the statement on copy.fail is correct, that the fix was in mainline on 1st of April.
From my point of view, I would suggest that maybe the communication downstream to the distros was not handled that well? But who would be to blaim? The researches that would need to communicate this issue to most existing distros? Linux maintainers? Distro maintainers?
Hard to say, without knowing the communication of the related mailinglists and disclousre etc.
Honestly, thats a really bad take. Yes obviously, you should not let attackers access the terminal, but there are linux servers that rely on multiuser operations, like Servers that are meant for terminal access, like HPC.
Then services get hosted via container these days, so even with rootless containers you get root access if you only get RCE on one service. And even if there are additional VMs for more isolation between host, you still get root on the whole VM.
Looking at the CVE on NIST,i found following commit which dates to 30.03
The patches where proposed over a month ago and the patch to the kernel was commited on 1th of April.
Either the Vulnerability was not proper communicated to the distro maintainers or they were the ones sleeping.
This was probably executed as a responsible discllsure where clear timelines and release dates get communicated from the beginning.
I find it hard to blame the security team here when there was 1 month of time between first commited patch and release of the PoC.
I have q xyz Domain as my main Domain. And there are basically no issues here. But in 1 or 2 places i noticed that the domain gets blocked, a couple of free/open wifis or a couple of DNS servers. But nothing major imho.
By default this applications allows when adding a server, that the communication is not encrypted between the app and the server. This should be configured by default to enforce TLS encryption. If someone would want to disable dis behavior and allow unencrypted communication, then this should take extra steps.
As i commented somewhere else, to say that since it is turned off it is secure by default, is like saying: “The SSH server is turned off by default so the configuration that comes with it does not need to be secure when shipped”
Thats like saying:
“The SSH Server configuration does not need to be secure because the SSH Server is turned off by default”
Yes, this is what we’re discussing… Are you a bot?
Obviously no. But you keep dodging the point here. And instead of comming up with an argument against my point, you seem to try to attack me personally.
In security and development there is a statement, called “secure by default”. That means the default settings are secure. This would encapsulate something like enforced Transport encryption.
Does this mean that the config can not be changed to fit the thread model? No.
Not sure why you’ve chosen to be indignant about this particular implementation.
We are talking about a tracking App. Most selfhosted projects do not store such private data. You may can mage the argument for immich but only for ppl who take a picture every 5 min.
If the target server is compromised or taken by LEA the data is gone.
Laying the responsibility into the hands of the user is not ok for such an data aggregating service. Such highly critical, private and intime data should be protected and secure by default.
Not even transport encryption is enforced in the project. At first glance, http is allowed on local connections?!? Generate a self signed SSL cert on start and pin it in the app. Easy.
It is no excuse that other services do not follow these state of the art protection measures.
netbird uses wireguard as vpn protocol