As I said, when you know the exact path of a media item on the server then you can check if the item exists.

If you choose a none standard filepath its not an issue.

Should that be fixed yes.

Whats the scenario? A law firm could brute force check all media items on open jellyfin servers? Highly illegal to exploit something like this in a lot of jurisdiction. And would also not proof the existence of the media on the server, just a file named like it.

Mitigation? Just add another random letter in the docker-compose mount path.

Have you even read the issues and understood them?

Yes, those should be fixed, but unless you are worried about someone hijacking a video stream when you use a generic media path, there is not that much to worry about.

deleted by creator

7.0-rc7 is probably due to the 7.0 release early mid april. So the fix was in the mainline on 1st of April. The commit on 11th from GKH was probably due to the release.

I am not that familiar with the commit and release structure to get more into detail. But to me it clearly looks like the statement on copy.fail is correct, that the fix was in mainline on 1st of April.

From my point of view, I would suggest that maybe the communication downstream to the distros was not handled that well? But who would be to blaim? The researches that would need to communicate this issue to most existing distros? Linux maintainers? Distro maintainers?

Hard to say, without knowing the communication of the related mailinglists and disclousre etc.

Honestly, thats a really bad take. Yes obviously, you should not let attackers access the terminal, but there are linux servers that rely on multiuser operations, like Servers that are meant for terminal access, like HPC.

Then services get hosted via container these days, so even with rootless containers you get root access if you only get RCE on one service. And even if there are additional VMs for more isolation between host, you still get root on the whole VM.

Looking at the CVE on NIST,i found following commit which dates to 30.03

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a664bf3d603dc3bdcf9ae47cc21e0daec706d7a5

The patches where proposed over a month ago and the patch to the kernel was commited on 1th of April.

Either the Vulnerability was not proper communicated to the distro maintainers or they were the ones sleeping.

This was probably executed as a responsible discllsure where clear timelines and release dates get communicated from the beginning.

I find it hard to blame the security team here when there was 1 month of time between first commited patch and release of the PoC.

I have q xyz Domain as my main Domain. And there are basically no issues here. But in 1 or 2 places i noticed that the domain gets blocked, a couple of free/open wifis or a couple of DNS servers. But nothing major imho.

By default this applications allows when adding a server, that the communication is not encrypted between the app and the server. This should be configured by default to enforce TLS encryption. If someone would want to disable dis behavior and allow unencrypted communication, then this should take extra steps.

As i commented somewhere else, to say that since it is turned off it is secure by default, is like saying: “The SSH server is turned off by default so the configuration that comes with it does not need to be secure when shipped”

Thats like saying:

“The SSH Server configuration does not need to be secure because the SSH Server is turned off by default”

Yes, this is what we’re discussing… Are you a bot?

Obviously no. But you keep dodging the point here. And instead of comming up with an argument against my point, you seem to try to attack me personally.

In security and development there is a statement, called “secure by default”. That means the default settings are secure. This would encapsulate something like enforced Transport encryption.

Does this mean that the config can not be changed to fit the thread model? No.

Not sure why you’ve chosen to be indignant about this particular implementation.

We are talking about a tracking App. Most selfhosted projects do not store such private data. You may can mage the argument for immich but only for ppl who take a picture every 5 min.

If the target server is compromised or taken by LEA the data is gone.

Laying the responsibility into the hands of the user is not ok for such an data aggregating service. Such highly critical, private and intime data should be protected and secure by default.

Not even transport encryption is enforced in the project. At first glance, http is allowed on local connections?!? Generate a self signed SSL cert on start and pin it in the app. Easy.

It is no excuse that other services do not follow these state of the art protection measures.

I absolutely agree with you. Such private data should be End-To-End-Encrypted.

German: netcup.eu

Sorry, but you have posted only 1 sentence about the project and not even a link to the project.

Additional with the

scripts—basically “em dash” which is really popular among llm generated texts, i get a bad feeling about it.

Is it standard practice to release the security updates on GitHub?

Yes.

And then the maintainers of the package on the package repository you use will release the patch there. Completely standard operation.

I recommend younto read up on package repositories on Linux and package maintainers etc.

The cli.

I have used management interfaces like coxkpit in the last but i do not really like it that much. I have E-Mail Notifications setup for updates via aptitude and monitor using prometheus and grafana and get additional notifications via prometheus alarm manager.

For an easy to use docker interface i use dockge, since i found it in this use case to be faster with a good, working, independend Interface.

But for the Linux underneath, for all 10-20 servers i managae, CLI.

Looking for a simple card/cal/WebDAV server that runs in docker.

Or maybe just because there is nothing simple in hosting a mail server for having card and caldav.