

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1339
Everything regarding enforcement is early stages but what they’re aiming for is much more specific than chat control and is based on existing wording in the Digital Services Act.
i’m lizard
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1339
Everything regarding enforcement is early stages but what they’re aiming for is much more specific than chat control and is based on existing wording in the Digital Services Act.
There’s a disclaimer in the readme: https://github.com/juanfont/headscale/?tab=readme-ov-file#disclaimer
The maintainer Tailscale contributes happens to be the lead developer by commit count at the moment.
They also had a major ass security issue that a security company should not be able to get away with the other day: assuming everyone with access to an email domain trusts each other unless it’s a known-to-them freemail address. And it was by design “to reduce friction”.
I don’t think a security company where an intentional decision like that can pass through design, development and review can make security products that are fit for purpose. This extends to their published client tooling as used by Headscale, and to some extent the Headscale maintainer hours contributed by Tailscale (which are significant and probably also the first thing to go if the company falls down the usual IPO enshittification).
Not them but between those two I’d recommend Kanboard if you’re going to be the only user. Far lighter and easier to administer piece of kit, has everything you’d want from a fancy task list but not much more. WeKan is rather heavy software but does have a few features that are probably quite important for large team use.
PUID
is indeed handled inside the container itself, it’ll run a container-provided script as whatever the container’s UID 0 happens to be first which then drops to whatever $PUID
happens to be inside the container. user=
is enforced by Podman itself before the container starts, but Podman will still run as root in that setup. That means Podman is running “rootful”, while if you started the container manually as $uid using the regular Podman CLI, it would be “rootless”. That is a major difference in a lot of respects, including security, and you can find quite a bit of documentation on the differences between those operating modes online; it wouldn’t fit in a comment. Rootless is generally considered the better mode, though there are some things that still require a rootful container.
In the upcoming NixOS 25.05 or current unstable, there are some tools you can use to run containers rootless as another user more easily using a new $name.podman.user = "";
setting. From what I understand they’ll still be root-managed systemd system services that require sudo to operate, but that means privileges get dropped by systemd before running Podman, instead of dropped by Podman before running the container. This stuff is recent and I haven’t used it, I just happen to know it exists, relevant nixpkgs commit if you wanna dig into it yourself: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/commit/7d443d378b07ad55686e9ba68faf16802c030025
FWIW, your domain will most likely eventually get used by spammers and then it’ll be an endless string of somewhat expected but unpredictable failures from there on onwards, with no actions you can take to reduce it. It’s good to keep an eye on what comes in but I wouldn’t invest too much effort into failure alerting.
Borg or the like with ‘hardcoded’ plaintext/regularly full-disk-encrypted key is acceptable. Someone that has your unencrypted private key sitting on your server has almost certainly already obtained access to the entire set of data you’re backing up, with the backup key itself only meaningfully guarding access to older backups.
The more important thing is to securely keep extra copies in case the server fails. I keep mine in a group in my password manager, one per repo.
(It’s a joke/reference, I guess it’s not 100% known though. My bad.)
I really do hate “I know what I have so you are going to pay whatever number I set” capitalism though, which is what they do here. These registrars figured out a loophole around the redemption grace period and are, from the start, set up to make you lose the domain and then spend significant money on a completely unfair auction where they have the power to plant fake bids, rather than paying the usual static redemption fees that aren’t that excessive.
Heartbreaking: The Worst Capitalist Practice You Know Just Accidentally Picked A Funny Target
You go to the settings and verify it. You don’t have to host anything, just verify that you own the domain via text file or DNS record and choose to set it as your handle. Bluesky’s ATProto has a couple extra layers of indirection and it’s very easy to get a custom handle as a result.
The downside of this setup is that running your own complete network is completely impossible. If you want to follow theonion.com
, anyone can find did:plc:a4pqq234yw7fqbddawjo7y35
in the DNS without too much work. That’s the identifier for The Onion’s Bluesky account, and even if they swapped back to .bsky.social
, that ID number would stay. But that DID tells you absolutely nothing about where the data is currently hosted.
So how do you figure that out? Well, you register it with https://plc.directory/ which is ran by Bluesky and cannot currently be replaced. There’s fancy cryptography involved that makes it hard for them to spoof data, but they are perfectly capable of simply not giving any data out for any given DID.
Most paid certs aren’t worth much anyway. Payment and delivery info for DV certs isn’t validated by anyone, it’s literally the same concept as Let’s Encrypt. OV and EV are the only ones that theoretically have any value, but nobody is using those ever since they got rid of the URL bar labeling; even Amazon is on DV nowadays.
Gonna add a dissenting “maybe but not really”. YT is really aggressive on this kinda stuff lately and the situation is changing month by month. YT has multiple ways of flagging your IP as potentially problematic and as soon as you get flagged you’re going to end up having to run quite an annoying mess of scripts that may or may not last in the long term. There’s some instructions in a stickied issue on the Invidious repo.
Personally, I do believe that rootless Docker/Podman have a strong enough security boundary for personal/individual self-hosting where you have decent trust in the software you’re running. Linux privilege escalation and container escape exploits fetch decent amounts of money on the exploit market, and nobody’s gonna waste them on some people running software ending in *arr when Zerodium will pay five figures for a local privilege escalation or container escape. If you’re running a business or you might be targeted for whatever reason (journalist or whatever) then that doesn’t apply.
If you want more security, there are container runtimes that do cooler security stuff under the hood, like Firecracker/Kata Containers implementing a managed VM, or Google’s gVisor which very strongly intercepts kernel syscalls and essentially reimplements Linux in userspace. Those are used by AWS and Google Cloud respectively. You can integrate those into Docker, though not all networking/etc options are supported.
For that card, you probably have to set the radeon.si_support=0 amdgpu.si_support=1
kernel options to allow amdgpu to work. I don’t have a TrueNAS system laying around so I don’t know what the idiomatic way to change them is.
Using amdgpu on that card has been considered experimental ever since it was added like 6 years ago, and nobody has invested any real efforts to stabilize it. It’s entirely possible that amdgpu on that card is simply never gonna work. But yeah I think the radeon driver isn’t really fully functional anymore either, so I guess it’s worth a shot…
.eu has custom rules for whois. You’re not allowed to use privacy/proxy services for anything other than the mandatory publicly shown email field, but for domains registered by an individual, that email field and the user’s preferred language are the only things displayed. They’ve had those rules even prior to GDPR.
All true, wanted to add on to this:
That’s true, and it’s not just something mildly imperfect, read-only straight up does nothing. For connecting to a socket, Linux ignores read-only mount state and only checks write permission on the socket itself. Read-only would only make it impossible to make a new socket there. Once you do have a connection, that connection can write anything it wants to it. Traefik and other “read-only” uses still have to send GET queries for the data they need, so that’s happening for legitimate use cases too.
If you really need a “GET-only” Docker socket, it has to be done with some other kind of mechanism, and frankly the options aren’t very good. Docker has authorization plugins that seem like too much of a headache to set up, and proxies don’t seem very good to me either.
Or TLDR:
:ro
or stripping off permission bits doesn’t do anything aside from potentially break all uses for the socket. If it can connect at all, it’s root-equivalent or has all privileges of your rootless user, unless you took other steps. That might or might not be a massive problem for your setup, but it is something you should know when doing it.